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Here we clarify the assumptions made and conclusions reached in our paper “The thermodynam-
ical cost of some interpretations of quantum theory” [Phys. Rev. A 94, 052127 (2016)], at the light
of the criticisms of Prunkl and Timpson [Stud. Hist. Philos. Sci. Part B: Stud. Hist. Philos. Mod.
Phys. 63, 114 (2018)], and Davidsson (Master thesis, Stockholm University, 2018). We point out
some misunderstandings and some weaknesses of the counterexample Prunkl and Timpson present
to challenge our conclusion. We thus conclude, once more, that interpretations of quantum theory
which consider the probabilities of measurement outcomes to be determined by objective properties
of the measured system and satisfy the assumption that the measured system only has finite memory
have a thermodynamical cost.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Ref. [1] Prunkl and Timpson, and in Ref. [2] Davids-
son, claim that the conclusion of our paper “The ther-
modynamical cost of some interpretations of quantum
theory” [3] is incorrect. Here we will explain why we dis-
agree with the arguments by these authors and clarify
the result in [3] and its implications.
Let us begin by summarizing the result in Ref. [3].
Following Ref. [4], we call type I interpretations of quan-
tum theory those in which the probabilities of measure-
ment outcomes are determined by preexisting objective
properties of the measured system. Bohmian mechan-
ics [5] and Everett’s interpretation [6] are examples of
type I interpretations. In Bohmian mechanics, measure-
ment outcomes are determined by the initial position of
the measured system and by the state of the quantum
potential which is a field permeating the whole universe.
Similarly, in Everett’s interpretation, measurement out-
comes are determined by the universal wave function.
In contrast to that, type II interpretations are those
in which the probabilities of measurement outcomes are
not determined by preexisting objective properties of the
measured system. Quantum Bayesianism [7] is an exam-
ple of a type II interpretation. A more comprehensive
classification of the interpretations of quantum theory as
type I or type II can be found in Ref. [4].
The result in Ref. [3] is that those type I interpretations
which satisfy three additional assumptions described be-
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low come with a thermodynamic cost. The proof is based
on the following ideal experiment: A single quantum sys-
tem (e.g., a trapped ion) is submitted to an unlimited
sequence of measurements. Each of these measurements
is randomly chosen from a given finite set. Ref. [8] de-
scribes an experiment of this type: 53 million sequential
dichotomic measurements, each of them randomly chosen
from a set of 13 qutrit measurements. The three addi-
tional assumptions on which the argument is based are
the following:
(i) The choice of measurement is random and indepen-
dent of the system.
(ii) The system has limited memory. That is, the mem-
ory the system has access to is finite.
(iii) Landauer’s principle [9] holds: the erasure of one
bit of information of the memory of the system must be
accompanied by a corresponding entropy increase in its
environment, causing the dissipation of, at least, kT ln 2
units of heat.
Implicit is also the assumption that the system only
takes information available in the past to produce the
probabilities of the outcomes of future measurements.
Our argument is as follows. In type I interpretations sat-
isfying assumptions (i)–(iii), the objective properties the
system had previous to the measurement change during
each measurement. In particular, the outcomes of fu-
ture measurements change. Because of assumption (i),
the measured system does not know which particular se-
quence of measurements will be performed. Because of
assumption (ii), the system cannot store the outcomes
for all possible sequences of measurements in its memory.
Instead, after each measurement, the system has to add
new information to its memory. The system can achieve
2this by, either, writing on empty memory or, if there
is none, by overwriting part of its memory. Overwrit-
ing constitutes a logically irreversible operation. Since
the memory of the system is finite, after a certain point
the system must overwrite its memory. Then, because
of Landauer’s principle, the system must dissipate heat
at least in an amount proportional to the information
erased.
If the set of possible measurements contains n different
choices, Ref. [3] shows that the average dissipated heat
per measurement performed grows linearly with n. Since,
in principle, n can be arbitrarily large, the system should
dissipate an unbounded amount of heat in each measure-
ment. This constitutes a kind of ultraviolet catastrophe
or “heat death” [10], which may lead to the conclusion
that type I interpretations satisfying assumptions (i)–(iii)
are untenable and that thermodynamics constrains the
possible interpretations of quantum theory.
In contrast, in type II interpretations measurement
outcomes are not governed or constrained by any pre-
existent property of the measured system. Measurement
outcomes are simply manifestations of the fact that the
“system” is preserved. Consequently, the system does
not need to keep any information internally nor over-
write any preexisting information. Therefore, the system
does not need to dissipate heat.
II. “CENTRAL REALIST INTERPRETATIONS”
ARE NOT AFFECTED
In Ref. [1], Prunkl and Timpson write:
“[T]he authors [of Ref. [3]] arrive at the con-
clusion that some quantum interpretations
(including central realist interpretations) are
associated with an excess heat cost and are
thereby untenable. (. . . ) If correct, this re-
sult would (. . . ) force us to abandon some
of the most popular interpretations of quan-
tum mechanics (Type I interpretations in-
clude such favourites as de Broglie Bohm the-
ory, Everett, and dynamical collapse theories
such as GRW, for example).”
This is simply not true, the conclusion of Ref. [3] does
not force us to abandon “central realist interpretations”
such as Bohmian mechanics or Everett’s interpretation
because they fail to satisfy assumption (ii) as is clearly
stated in Ref. [3] when we point out that:
”[O]ur result does not exclude Bohmian me-
chanics or the many worlds interpretation,
since in both cases assumption (ii) is not sat-
isfied (in Bohmian mechanics because the ob-
served system includes an underlying contin-
uous field and in the many worlds interpre-
tation because the system itself splits in each
measurement).”
Instead, the message of Ref. [3] is precisely that not only
Bohmian mechanics and Everett’s interpretation, but any
type I interpretation must allow the system to have access
to infinite memory.
III. PRUNKL AND TIMPSON’S
“COUNTER-EXAMPLE”
Prunkl and Timpson construct an example to illustrate
their point that type I interpretations do not imply that
a quantum system dissipates heat when being measured.
We see two problems with this example, each one of them
disqualifying it as a “counter”-example in our view: it is
not an example of a type I interpretation, and it does
not do an accurate thermodynamic accounting. We now
discuss these problems in turn.
A. Prunkl and Timpson’s model is not type I
Firstly, in the framework in Ref. [3], the output
of the measurement is important and cannot be ig-
nored. To simulate the behavior of a quantum system,
a well-defined input-output behavior needs to be simu-
lated. This necessitates a physical output, irrespective
of whether or not there is an external agent recording
it. However, the model by Prunkl and Timpson does
not output anything. Therefore, it fails to simulate the
experiment in Ref. [3].
Secondly, measurements in the model by Prunkl and
Timpson are described by partitioning the system of four
states in two different ways. In order to account for a
repeated outcome as predicted by quantum theory for the
experiment in Ref. [3], the model by Prunkl and Timpson
would require the partition to be almost always present.
That is, performing a “measurement” would consist of:
(A) Removing the existing partition, then
(B) rapidly inserting the partition corresponding to the
new measurement choice (rapidly with respect to
the free motion of the particle), then
(C) finding out in which side of the partition the par-
ticle is, and then
(D) waiting for the particle position to be uniformly
distributed in the region accessible to the particle.
However, this does not give a type I model. The epis-
temic state is the position of the particle and the chosen
partition. There is no ontic state (i.e., no state that is
responsible for the probabilities of the measurement out-
comes). The mechanism Prunkl and Timpson propose
always randomizes over time relative to the previously
performed measurement. Therefore, ontic states before
the measurement are not well-defined. Thus, one cannot
talk about preexisting objective properties of the system
3determining the probabilities of the outcomes. Therefore,
it is not a type I model.
Moreover, it cannot be converted into a type I model
satisfying the limited memory assumption. It is possible
to modify the model so it has well-defined ontic states.
For that, both partitions need to be in place between the
“measurements” which results in four regions. Then, a
“measurement” would consist of:
(A’) Removing one of the two partitions, then
(B’) finding out where the particle is, then
(C’) waiting for the position of the particle to be uni-
formly distributed in the region accessible to the
particle, and then
(D’) re-inserting the removed partition.
This modified model has ontic states. However, the ontic
state space is continuous and hence requires unbounded
memory. Therefore, this modified model is type I, but
fails to satisfy the assumption of limited memory.
B. Prunkl and Timpson’s set-up does not consider
a full thermodynamic cycle
The second problem with the counter-example relates
to the so-called RAND operation. The RAND oper-
ation was introduced [11] as a proposed logically irre-
versible operation that does not generate heat following
Landauer’s principle, arguing that RAND randomizes a
system state rather than resets it to a predefined state.
It is therefore not a logical operation as the output is not
deterministic. This was later discussed in Ref. [12].
As seen in Fig. 2 of Ref. [1], the system starts off, at
time t−1, in a particular state (xt−1 = 0, yt−1 = 0), then
undergoes a RAND operation and is left, at time t, in one
of three possible states ((xt = 0, yt = 0), (xt = 1, yt = 0),
or (xt = 1, yt = 1)). In this case, the missing part of the
cycle is the reset to the initial state xt = 0, yt = 0.
Let us examine how the “reset” operation would be
done in this case: (a) Remove the partition correspond-
ing to the computational basis, (b) use two pistons to
compress each region in one direction to half of its ini-
tial size, then, (c) insert the partition in question and
return the pistons to their original position. This always
outputs the epistemic state “|0〉” and has a work cost
because of pressure against the compressing piston.
Any other “reset” operation also must have a heat
cost because otherwise, one could use it to construct a
perpetuum mobile violating the first or second law of
thermodynamics. One construction would be as follows:
(1) “Measure” in the computational basis, (2) if the out-
come is 0, then stop, otherwise, “measure” in the phase
basis, and repeat from (1). This procedure will eventu-
ally reset the system to |0〉 with no heat cost according
to Prunkl and Timpson, since they claim their “measure-
ments” have no heat cost. Such a reset operation could be
followed with the first “reset” operation above reversed
to extract work from the system in the state |0〉. This
would clearly violate the second law of thermodynamics.
Note that this is independent of the considerations in
Subsection IIIA, and applies even in the case where the
system is allowed to reach thermal equilibrium between
the two operations.
C. A misconception of computational mechanics
Another misconception concerns the information stor-
age of the so-called causal states in the ǫ-machine. Prunkl
and Timpson [1] write:
“[[3]] say “The average information that must
be erased per measurement is the information
contained in the causal state previous to the
measurement, St−1, that is not contained in
the causal state after the measurement, St.”
(Cabello et al., 2016, p. 2). This formula-
tion is perhaps somewhat misleading, as it
suggests that a particular causal state itself
carries a certain amount of information. In
fact, it is not the causal state to which we
assign an entropy, but it is instead the proba-
bility distribution over causal states which is
associated with an entropy and thereby with
a Shannon information.”
In our notation, “the causal state previous to the mea-
surement, St−1,” is a random variable that has a proba-
bility distribution, the entropy of which, H(St−1), is the
statistical complexity of the ǫ-machine. The random vari-
able St−1, conditioned on a particular value of the causal
state at time t, St = sj, is again a random variable with
a probability distribution, but now a different one. The
corresponding entropy is H(St−1|St = sj). This should
then be averaged over all possible states sj to obtain the
average information mentioned in the beginning of the
quote above.
IV. DAVIDSSON’S “REFUTATION”
Davidsson’s Master thesis [2] contains, in our opinion,
a well-written overview and formal treatment of Lan-
dauer’s principle, focusing on extending the principle to
quantum systems. There is also a rederivation of our
bound that confirms the correctness of our calculations.
Perhaps it is appropriate to point out that our bound
Ierased(n) > n is exact, and not approximate as claimed
in [2] (there denoted 〈Iε〉 > n), since
2n+1−1∑
j=0
cos2( pij
2n+1
) =
2n−1∑
j=0
cos2( pij
2n+1
) + sin2( pij
2n+1
) = 2n,
(1)
4so that
Ierased(n) = −
2n+1−1∑
j=0
cos2
(
pij
2n+1
)
2n
log
cos2
(
pij
2n+1
)
2n
> −
2n+1−1∑
j=0
cos2
(
pij
2n+1
)
2n
log
1
2n
= n.
([3]:9)
Davidsson continues with an argument that the en-
tropy of the quantum system under study should be cal-
culated from the quantum description. The argument
reviews the differences between the classical and quan-
tum treatments and continues:
In this framework, von Neumann entropy SN
(. . . ) can be motivated as the basis for calcu-
lating entropies in physical quantum systems,
and thus becomes the basis for generalizing
the Landauer bound and Landauers princi-
ple (. . . ) to quantum systems . . . Thus we
should calculate entropy in a quantum system
from the density matrix, according to equa-
tion ([2]:216), and the calculation made by
Cabello et al. appear[s] conceptually inaccu-
rate. . . . In conclusion, it is premise [2]:7.3
[Landauer’s principle holds] that fails. Not
because Landauers principle does not hold,
but because it does not apply to decreases of
entropy associated with causal states in this
particular set-up.
At this point, we must again stress that we address type I
interpretations of quantum theory, where the probabili-
ties of measurement outcomes are determined by preex-
isting objective properties of the measured system. Then,
we are allowed to calculate entropy from these preexisting
objective properties (which includes use of causal states in
one-to-one correspondence with nonorthogonal quantum
states), and use the output as a lower bound. There is
no conceptual inaccuracy here: the preexisting objective
properties, together with assumptions (i)–(iii), enables
the corresponding increased lower bound.
That being said, we find it sensible to use Davids-
son’s generalized Landauer’s principle for other interpre-
tations, i.e., type I interpretations where assumptions
(i)–(iii) do not hold, and type II interpretations. In this
case,
This implies that entropy in this qubit-system
is, not only bounded from below by 0, but
also bounded from above by 1 bit. Clearly,
the maximum change in entropy is therefore
bounded by 1 bit, implying that . . . any lower
bound cannot go above kT ln 2.
This underlines the difference between the possible
bounds from type I interpretations under assumptions
(i)–(iii), and other interpretations.
V. CONCLUSION
The conclusion of Ref. [3] is not that type I interpreta-
tions such as Bohmian mechanics or Everett’s are unten-
able, as Prunkl and Timpson [1] claim, but rather that in
all type I interpretations the measured system must have
access to infinite memory. Secondly, the counter-example
that Prunkl and Timpson provide is not an example of a
type I interpretation since it does not provide preexist-
ing objective properties that determine the probabilities
of measurement outcomes. Even if we attempt to modify
it to contain such properties, it will use infinite memory
to provide the outcome probabilities. Furthermore, the
system properties suggested by Prunkl and Timpson can
be used to construct a perpetuum mobile, i.e., these prop-
erties violate the first or second law of thermodynamics.
This should conclude any argument on the issue.
Davidsson’s thesis [2] contains a generalization of the
Landauer principle to the quantum case, and we do not
dispute general use of the resulting lower bound. But
for type I interpretations we maintain that the preexist-
ing objective properties that determine outcome prob-
abilites, together with assumption (i)–(iii), enable the
increased lower bound of Ref. [3].
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